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Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical
Reason and the Inevitability of
Violence: Human Freedom in the
Milieu of Scarcity
Michael J. Monahan
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Stephanie Black’s 2001 documentary film Life and Debt contains
a striking moment in which Jamaican dairy farmers are seen pouring
fresh milk onto the ground because it would cost more to preserve the
milk and ship it to market than it would fetch when it arrived at that
market. Hundreds of gallons of milk are wasted, in a country that
suffers from immense poverty, because the price of imported fresh
and powdered milk had become so cheap that domestic dairy
production had been rendered economically irrational. This moment of
film serves as a compelling focal point with and through which to think
about the notion of scarcity – a concept so central to Sartre’s account
of human struggle and history in both volumes of the Critique of
Dialectical Reason. There has been very important work done in the
English language on Sartre’s Critique (Aronson 1987, Catalano 1986)
as well as his accounts of violence (Santoni 2003), history (Flynn
1997), and political struggle (McBride 1991) -all of which are,
according to Sartre, conditioned by scarcity. Nevertheless, there
seems to be relatively little sustained discussion of scarcity itself, and
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what there is retains the fundamental ambiguity at the heart of
Sartre’s own account. For the sake of a commitment to an engaged
philosophy, it is crucial that this ambiguity be thoroughly explored.
This paper is an effort to begin this exploration by opening up a
dialog within Sartre scholarship about the nature and function of
scarcity. This is important not only because it will foster a better
understanding of Sartre’s own views on violence and reciprocity and
allow for a more rigorous critical assessment of those views, but also
because it will have an impact on political and economic theory
generally. I will open with a brief account of the function of scarcity
within both volumes of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, then provide
a critical assessment of that account. I will conclude by drawing upon
some of the resources provided in the Critique to point toward what I
will argue is a more accurate, and politically positive, account of
scarcity.

Scarcity in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason
Economic theory at least since Hume and Smith has been
predicated upon the notion that we live in a world in which resources
are scarce. There simply are not enough of the things human beings
want and need in the world to go around. In Hobbesian contract
theory, it is the lack of resources sufficient to satisfy everyone’s
desires that makes it rational for any given individual to emerge from
the state of nature by means of contract—if there were enough of the
things we desire to satisfy all of our desires, there would be no need to
constrain one’s immediate interests so as to secure long term benefits
by means of contract (Hobbes 1985:104-106). The basic mechanisms
of capitalism (supply and demand, market value, diminishing returns,
labor costs) all function within a context of scarce resources. As Robert
Goodin points out, it is “moderate scarcity” which drives the market
economy – if there were abundance, there would be no need for trade,
while if there were extreme scarcity, there would be little incentive to
keep our contracts (Goodin 2001: 204-206). Thus, dominant market
theories and political structures are all framed by some notion of
material scarcity.1 So what, exactly, is scarcity, and how does it
function? Returning to the example of the dairy farmers in Life and
Debt, what can we say about the scarcity of milk on that farm, in
Jamaica, and globally?
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In Being and Nothingness, Sartre saw the desire to be in-andfor-oneself (the desire to be God) as the engine that drives human
conflict and struggle (Sartre 1956: 397-400). The look of the other
compromises my project of being in-and-for-myself, and so conflict will
arise in an effort to eliminate, or at least dominate, that other. In the
Critique of Dialectical Reason, however, it is scarcity that drives
violence and conflict. Sartre states:
Man exists for everyone as non-human man, as an alien
species. And this does not necessarily mean that conflict is
already interiorized and lived as a fight for survival. It simply
means that the mere existence of everyone is defined by
scarcity as the constant danger of non-existence both for
another and for everyone. (Sartre 1991a: 130)
It is the reality of scarcity as the “individual relation” and “social
milieu” (Sartre 1991a: 127n)—the simple fact that “There is not
enough for everybody” (Sartre 1991a: 128) – that conditions each
individual’s status as a real threat to each other. Scarcity undermines
human interaction in a manner that is fundamentally antagonistic. In
Sartre’s own terms, reciprocity between human beings is corrupted:
“In pure reciprocity, that which is Other than me is also the same. But
in reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as antihuman in so far as this same man appears as radically Other – that is
to say, as threatening us with death” (Sartre 1991a: 131-132). Thus,
according to Sartre, the milieu of scarcity, which he later claimed
“appears as soon as there is animal life” (Schilpp 1981: 13), makes it
the case that every other organism is a literal threat to any given
individual’s existence, insofar as each organism is consuming an
amount of scarce resources necessary for life.
This in turn means that “scarcity is experienced in practice
through Manichaean action, and that the ethical takes the form of the
destructive imperative: evil must be destroyed” (Sartre 1991a: 133).
Sartre claims further that “In the framework of scarcity, constitutive
relations are fundamentally antagonistic” (Sartre 1991b: 15), and that
humanity will be violent until the elimination of scarcity (Sartre 1991a:
736). We are left with a rather bleak picture. As long as there is
scarcity, there will be violence, as human beings struggle to secure
what they can of scarce resources, which security can only come at the
expense of the insecurity of some other(s). “Struggle”, therefore, “is
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scarcity as a relationship of men with one another” (Sartre 1991b: 14)
[emphasis mine]. Scarcity thus stands as a fundamental negation of
the human (as Anti-Human), which negation in turn invites its own
negation (counter-violence), by way of praxis directed either toward
overcoming scarcity, or toward insulating oneself from scarcity at the
expense of others. Of course, both forms of praxis will, in due course,
lead to “counter-finalities” and become “altered” such that they will
inevitably lead to effects which differ, sometimes disastrously, from
their intended goal.
For now, two important points need to be made about Sartre’s
account of scarcity. First, he has a peculiar view about the necessity of
scarcity. On the one hand, he denies outright that it is a logical or a
priori necessity (Sartre 1991a: 125; Sartre 1991b: 14-15). Equally
clearly, he rejects the notion that scarcity is “ontological” (Schilpp
1981: 13, 31). On the other hand, he states that this particular world
is definitely one of scarcity, and seems very dubious about the
possibility of overcoming that scarcity (Sartre 1991a: 127-128;
Schilpp 1981: 32). Scarcity is thus not an a priori reality (Sartre
1991a: 125), but the historical (and thus ultimately contingent)
condition from which humanity emerged (Sartre 1991a: 131). In this
way scarcity functions as a natural, but not a logical, necessity. Like
the gravity constant on earth, it could have been otherwise, but it is
the same for everyone on this planet, and it is beyond our power to
change it. This account of the inevitability of scarcity will prove
important for my later critical assessment.
Second, Sartre claims that scarcity functions as a kind of
foundation for human struggle (and thus History), but it is not a
sufficient cause of that struggle. Scarcity exists as a milieu that
explains human praxis, in that it inevitably (as per the above)
conditions that praxis, but it does not strictly cause it (Sartre 1991a:
127). Scarcity thus exists both as a kind of exis, or passive mode of
Being, in that the material world contains within it the possibility of
universal destruction, and it is a praxis, or active manifestation of
freedom, in that we interiorize that scarcity and act it out through
others and ourselves (and of course, in series being, through ourselves
as Other). As Sartre states:
I do not claim that the relation of reciprocity ever existed in
man before the relation of scarcity, man being, after all, the
historical product of scarcity. But without this human relation of
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reciprocity the non-human relation of scarcity would not exist.
Indeed, scarcity, as a univocal relation of each and of all to
matter, finally becomes an objective social structure of the
material environment, and in that way its inert finger points to
every individual as both a cause and a victim of scarcity. (Sartre
1991a: 131)
In other words, human praxis (freedom) is both the cause and
consequence of scarcity. It is the cause insofar as our choices and
actions make use of and even exacerbate scarcity, and it is a
consequence insofar as our choices and actions are always conditioned
by and intelligible within a milieu of scarcity. As Joseph Catalano puts
it: “This world is a world of struggle, because there is not enough for
all. But it will become clear that this scarcity is also the world as made
scarce by praxis” (Catalano 1986: 108) [emphasis mine]. Humanity
(as freedom) is thus intimately bound up with scarcity both at the level
of praxis and of exis. Echoing Catalano, Thomas Flynn states that
“Given the fact of scarcity, violence permeates human history. But
Sartrean violence is always a relation between free, organic praxes
mediated by ‘worked matter’” (Flynn 1997: 133). Thus, scarcity alone
does not cause human conflict, we have to choose to engage in
struggle, but at the same time, within the (de facto universal) milieu
of scarcity, the choice of conflict “is always being reborn” (Sartre
1991a: 134).
Scarcity in Sartre’s Critique ultimately stands as a fundamental
ground for human interaction, and one that leads ineluctably to
conflict. Scarcity is not a logical necessity, it is not an a priori given
(Sartre 1991a: 125, Aronson 1987: 48), but it is contingently a
universal condition of our facticity, and thus informs all of human
praxis. That being said, it does not determine our praxis, and Sartre
would be a poor existentialist indeed if he thought otherwise. Scarcity
itself may not be chosen, but how we respond to it is chosen— in the
same way that one is not responsible for being free, but is inescapably
responsible for the way in which that freedom is made manifest.
Sartre’s ambiguity regarding scarcity, in other words, can be explained
in part as a reflection of the inherent metastability of the human
condition. We are responsible for scarcity—we “create a field of
scarcity around us” (Schilpp 1981: 31), but at the same time we
cannot simply will scarcity away, nor can any given individual
determine on her own how scarcity will impact her life.
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Before moving on to a critical assessment of this account of
scarcity, it will be useful to first take a step back and look more closely
at the roots of scarcity for Sartre, and then to examine the treatments
of scarcity found in the more important secondary literature. Scarcity,
in the Critique, emerges originally because human praxis is driven by
need (Sartre 1991a: 80). This is linked to our status as organic
subjects, and thus to actual substances necessary for our continued
survival. But scarcity itself quickly transcends these material
necessities, and becomes anything that, for a given subject, is lacking.
Thus, among the examples Sartre employs as manifestations of
scarcity are such diverse elements as: time, gold, machines,
technology, knowledge, coal, and even people (either as means to
accomplish some public works project, or as labor, or as consumers for
some over-produced product). Thus it is important not to reduce
scarcity to needs, especially given our capacity, as free subjects, to act
in ways contrary to organic necessity. That is, it is not biological need
alone which conditions our actions in this way. We can engage in
hunger strikes, or carry out suicide missions, for example, both of
which demonstrate the inability of needs to determine our actions.
Thus, there is indeed “scarcity on every level and from every point of
view” (Schilpp 1981: 30), but scarcity alone cannot compel us into
acts of violence or struggle.
This does mean, however, that scarcity is extremely ubiquitous.
It is not merely that there is too little food, or water, or energy, but
that, given the finitude of resources both material and non-material,
paired with the infinitude of human desire and the lack that it
generates, everything can be, and on some level is, scarce. This is
obvious from the list of examples provided above. If even such things
as ideas can be scarce (Schilpp 1981: 30), then the traditional focus
on scarcity of material resources will be insufficient for the Sartrean
account.2 What this means is that for Sartre, scarcity is effectively the
air we breathe. Indeed, this is a very telling metaphor, since it rests on
the idea that air is so abundant. And yet, under the right
circumstances, air can be quite scarce. Consider someone trapped in a
mine, or climbing Mt. Everest, or enjoying a ride in Apollo 13 – even
the paradigmatically abundant has the potential to be scarce under the
right circumstances. Despite the fact that Sartre clearly includes
nonmaterial “goods” like ideas and time in his treatment of scarcity, I
will focus primarily upon material goods, both because they are
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paradigmatic as examples of the role of scarcity, and also because
they seem to present the greatest challenge to my ultimate goal,
which is to argue against the inevitability of conflict within the milieu
of scarcity.
Turning now to the secondary literature on scarcity, one finds
general agreement both on the interpretation of Sartre’s account, and
the assessment of its shortcomings. Scarcity is understood as
importantly linked to struggle and violence (Aronson 1987: 75;
Catalano 1986: 111, 114; Santoni 2003: 34, 65; Flynn 1997: 133;
McBride 1991: 128) yet at the same time as a contingent and
historical condition (Aronson 1987: 48, Catalano 1986: 108; McBride
1991: 109). Flynn summarizes the underlying tension here quite nicely
when he writes “Scarcity is profoundly historical in nature yet curiously
a priori in function” (Flynn 1997: 234). Scarcity, in sum, is the
condition of all human praxis, but is itself conditioned by that praxis
(Catalano 1986: 109, 116; Flynn 1997: 133). All of this raises two
important questions. First, what does this tell us about Sartre’s claims
regarding the apparent practical (if not a priori) inevitability of struggle
given the milieu of scarcity? Second, can we make any sense of his
further claims about the possibility (or lack thereof) “a true ‘socialism
of abundance’” (Flynn 1997: 124)?

Scarcity – A Phenomenological Appraisal
Given his views on scarcity, and its role as the foundation of
human conflict, it is important to subject Sartre’s account to serious
critical appraisal. What, exactly, is scarcity, and how plausible is
Sartre’s understanding of it? As is only fitting given the tradition within
which Sartre was working, I propose to subject the notion of scarcity
to phenomenological scrutiny. The phenomenologist cannot succumb
to the “natural attitude” (Husserl 1991: 33-37) and simply accept as
given the realty of scarcity and its effects upon human behavior and
institutions. Rather we must attend carefully and rigorously to the
experience of scarcity itself as a moment of consciousness. What is
taking place in the moment (and, as it turns out, one must be critical
about one’s understanding of a “moment” itself) at which one
apprehends something as scarce?
We constitute (Husserl 1991: 53-55) a product, object, idea,
amount of time, or whatever, as scarce by understanding it in some
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way as lacking, or at least as “about to be lacking .” By way of
example, I am sitting in a coffee shop as I write this, and I can find
scarcity wherever I look.3 Obviously, there is the coffee itself. My mug
is almost empty. And, since coffee does not exist here in absolute
abundance, I shall have to pay in order to have my mug refilled. Given
the work I am doing, the time it takes to do that work, and the length
of the line at the counter, I am now experiencing a scarcity of time in
addition to the scarcity of coffee in my mug. There is only so much
food left in the display cases. There are few tables left open. Even the
light seems a little dim for reading in most places. This is just the
surface, however. If I go beyond my immediate experience, there is so
much more. Scarcity conditions the cost and quality of the labor, and
the coffee, and the machines that are operated by the laborers to
produce the coffee. Likewise, the “barista/os” (as labor), the baked
goods, the ingredients in the baked goods, the fuel consumed in
shipping the baked goods here, and so on are all conditioned by and
manifestations of scarcity. Just as is the shop itself in relation to others
of its kind, both independent and corporate, the demographics of the
neighborhood it is in, competition from online coffee retailers, weather
patterns in coffee producing regions, etc. Every instance of scarcity is
itself conditioned by, and a factor in, other manifestations of scarcity,
and all of this in turn informs my perception of the coffee in my mug
as scarce. Scarcity, in short, seems every bit as ubiquitous as Sartre
suggests.
One can see from this extended example the give and take of
praxis and exis. We live in a world in which coffee, for example, will
grow well, if at all, in only so many places. It is a labor-intensive crop,
and must ravel quite a long way to be roasted and blended here in
Wisconsin. It is, in other words, a limited resource. At the same time,
it is a highly desired commodity, and this is a matter not of some
inherent biological necessity, nor is it a matter of natural or economic
laws. It is the result of a complex array of individual choices, each in
turn influenced by advertising, popular culture, recommendations from
friends, and the general “coffee culture.”4 Thus, the scarcity of the
coffee itself cannot be reduced either to the limitations on the resource
as such, nor to the human praxis that acts within those limitations. Its
scarcity is, as Sartre suggested, both a cause and a result of the
interactions of all of these interconnected facets.
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But things are even more complicated than this. Given that this
particular shop is also a roastery, and thus stuffed to the rafters with
bags of coffee, it seems odd that I should think of coffee, in this shop,
as “scarce.” In order to apprehend the coffee as scarce, it seems I
need to connect that coffee with the larger coffee market, labor
factors, processing costs, distribution costs, consumer demand, the
relative success of this year’s crops, and so on. There seems, in other
words, to be quite an abundance of coffee in this building, and my
perception of scarcity is on a fundamental level built not merely upon
my immediate perception, but rather upon my awareness of and
connection to the larger world of coffee beyond these walls.
Furthermore, this particular establishment serves only “Fair Trade”
certified coffee, which means that the international labor market in
coffee could tolerate lower wages than these producers are choosing to
pay. This increases the cost of the coffee, but there seem to be plenty
of people, including myself, willing to pay a premium for Fair Trade
coffee. So how scarce, really, is the coffee cooling in the vats, or being
brewed behind the counter, if we are all choosing to pay more than is
strictly necessary (in market terms, at least) for our cups of coffee?
Part of the problem lies in a basic ambiguity in the use and
meaning of the term “scarce” itself. On the one hand, it can be the
simple concept of being limited. Anything that is available only in a
finite amount is in this way scarce. This would be a largely descriptive
account of scarcity, and would, ultimately, include virtually everything.
Even air, as mentioned above, is scarce in this way. On the other
hand, scarcity can imply something more than a mere limit. It can also
mean that the commodity or product is in fact in relatively short
supply given some end or purpose. This is a more normative meaning
contingent upon certain goals and understandings of what is or is not a
sufficient supply for that goal. Lastly, there is the notion of scarcity
that points toward the more strictly economic sense of commanding a
high price. Diamonds are scarce in this sense, but only artificially so.
Diamond producers make no secret of the vast reserves of diamonds
that are purposefully kept off the market so as to maintain the value of
diamonds as a commodity. The phenomenology of scarcity undertaken
here will need to keep these distinctions in mind, though I will only
focus here upon the first two.
In the first, descriptive, sense of the term, to say of any
material resource that it is scarce is universally true. There is no thing
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that is in absolutely limitless supply. The second, normative, sense of
the term is more directly linked to human goals and actions, since the
scarcity or abundance of a resource will depend on our own needs and
desires, and, importantly, on the needs and desires of others. Coffee is
thus always scarce in the first, descriptive sense. Even if the amount
of coffee in the world were increased by several orders of magnitude,
it would still not be in strictly limitless supply. The scarcity of coffee in
the second sense, however, is far more complicated. Imagine the
manager of this shop leaving for vacation. She inventories the roasted
and unroasted beans, and decides that there is plenty of coffee to last
through her absence. Coffee, she decides, is in sufficient supply – she
need not address any scarcity of coffee before she leaves town. Or
suppose that she wants to reduce prices to increase sales – the same
quantity of coffee could now be seen as scarce, given this particular
goal. Whether the same amount of coffee is scarce in this normative
sense will depend not only upon the goals of the management of this
shop, but also on the consumption patterns of the customers. If a new
medical study reveals that coffee fights cancer, or prevents
Alzheimer’s disease, or increases sex drive, then what was an
abundant supply of coffee yesterday might suddenly become a scarce
supply, even if the amount of coffee in the building remained the
same.
This explains some of the complexity involved in the
apprehension of a product or commodity as scarce. The descriptive
sense of scarcity, the awareness of the supply as limited, is always
there, and is in effect a necessary condition for the normative sense of
scarcity. That is, if there were a limitless supply of something, it would
be impossible for there to be an amount insufficient for my goals. But
it does not seem that the descriptive sense of scarcity is a sufficient
condition for the normative sense. Again, think of oxygen. Oxygen is in
finite supply. Yet I don’t need to worry about my own consumption (do
I really have enough left to work-out today?), or that of others in
relation to my own (by resenting joggers for burning more than their
fair share, for example). Should I change my goals, however, oxygen
can become scarce in exactly this way. If I decide to climb Mt. Everest,
I’ll need to either train my body to make do with less oxygen
(decrease demand), or ensure that I bring enough extra oxygen with
me (increase supply). If I find myself trapped with you in a bank vault
or a mine, I may indeed resent it if you decide it’s time to do jumping
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jacks. Scarcity in the descriptive sense does indeed appear to be a
universal condition, but seldom is it what anyone is really concerned
with. That something is in limited supply only becomes important
given certain desires and goals within a particular material and social
setting. The scarcity in the normative sense that emerges in these
examples with oxygen requires scarcity in the first sense, but the fact
that there is a finite supply of oxygen normally doesn’t bother us in
the least.
I apprehend the coffee in my mug as scarce given both the fact
that there is but a finite supply of coffee not only in this shop, but
globally, and the fact that I would like, all things being equal, to have
more. What is more, given what I know about the demand for coffee
generally, and my own patterns of consumption, I can recognize the
scarcity of coffee even when I’m not particularly interested in more at
this exact moment. It is in this way that the “moment” in which one
apprehends the scarcity of coffee in fact participates both in a history
and a future of coffee globally and “for me.” What is crucial to the
phenomenology of scarcity, and something which Sartre seems to
have understood clearly, is the extent to which scarcity manifests the
metastability of the human condition through the interplay of these
two senses of the scarce. To use Sartre’s terminology, the descriptive
sense of scarcity is part of our given situation or exis, while the
normative sense is intimately and inescapably connected to human
freedom or praxis. This praxis can, at the same time, mitigate, elide,
exacerbate, or reveal the scarcity found in exis. There is, in other
words, a dialectical relation between the “brute fact” of a given supply
of something, and the human activity that confronts that supply. Our
apprehension of scarcity reflects this dialectic, in that it demonstrates
an awareness of the amount of a given commodity in relation to our
own goals, all of which must be understood in relation to the goals and
actions of others. The investigation of something as simple as a halfempty (or is it half-full?) coffee mug can, if pursued, reveal this
dialectic in all of its complexity.

A Critique of Sartre’s Account of Scarcity in the
Critique
There is a strong sense, then, in which Sartre’s claim that
scarcity is “a fundamental determination of man” (Sartre 1991a: 138)
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is correct. The more descriptive meaning of scarcity points toward the
fact that resources, both material and (some?) non-material, do not
exist or manifest themselves in perfect abundance. Scarcity is the
background condition, in this way, of all our actions, insofar as it is
impossible for us to have at our disposal everything that we could ever
want. This counterfactual conditional is crucial here, because scarcity
at this level refers not only to things that we actually want or need at
the present moment, but even to things that we think might be of
value or use in a possible future. If I think I have enough water for the
present, but I believe I could need more tomorrow, or next week, then
it turns out that I really do not have enough water – I have a scarcity
of water despite the fact that I have ample supply for my immediate
needs. All human action, therefore, is informed by the fact that this is
a world of finite resources, and any given individual’s use of any given
resource here and now means that there is less of that resource
available for someone else. And indeed, since so much of our activity
is directed toward the fulfillment of material and nonmaterial needs
and desires, that milieu of scarcity is what makes these actions of
consumption and stockpiling intelligible in the first place.
Where one might take issue with Sartre’s account is in regards
to his claims about the ethical implications of the milieu of scarcity.
Recall that Sartre characterizes scarcity as generating a Manichean
ethos. As conditioned by scarcity, Sartre tells us, human reciprocity
causes us to understand the other as “threatening us with death”
(Sartre 1991a: 132). He states further that “the mere existence of
everyone is defined by scarcity as the constant danger of nonexistence both for another and for everyone” (Sartre 1991a: 130).
What all of this in turn means is that “violence must be defined as a
structure of human action under the sway of Manichaeism and in a
context of scarcity. Violence always presents itself as counter-violence,
that is to say, as a retaliation against the violence of the Other”
(Sartre 1991a: 133). Human violence and conflict is thus driven, in a
sense, by the engine of scarcity. Indeed, “Struggle is scarcity as a
relationship of men with one another” (Sartre 1991b: 14). According
to Sartre, every other individual’s “mere existence” stands, within the
milieu of scarcity, as a threat to one’s own existence, and this threat
must ultimately be negated through conflict and violence in
“Manichean action.”

Sartre Studies International, Vol 14, No. 2 (Winter 2008): pg. 48-70. DOI. This article is © Berghahn Books and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Berghahn Books does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Berghahn Books.

12

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

This points toward what is clearly a rather bleak picture, and
one that, at its heart, shares much more in common with Hobbes than
a good Sartrean might like to admit. It is an account that seems to
commit Sartre to the view that violence is inevitable, if not ultimately
ontologically necessary, until such time as scarcity can be completely
eliminated (Sartre 1991a: 736). At the same time, given the very
broad definition of scarcity as simply that which is in finite supply, the
very notion that scarcity could be overcome seems highly implausible
to say the least. Nevertheless, the following exchange between Sartre
and Michael Rybalka is revealing:
R[ybalka]. Do you see a possible end to scarcity?
Sartre Not at the moment.
R. And what of the socialism we were talking about last time?
Sartre It would not lead to the disappearance of scarcity.
However, it is obvious that at that point ways of dealing
with scarcity could be sought and found. (Schilpp 1981:
32)
This finally brings the analysis back to the two questions I posed at the
end of the first section. How inevitable, really, is struggle and
violence? Is it possible to “overcome” scarcity at all? Sadly, the
interview moves on to a discussion of Heidegger at this point, and so
we are left to wonder. If “the overcoming of some scarcities – lack of
time or of ideas, for example – seems incompatible with the human
condition as such” (Flynn 1997: 235), then it would seem that the
more pessimistic interpretation of Sartre’s view must hold.
Fortunately, I believe that Sartre does provide the resources for
coming to some understanding of what this might mean.
First and foremost, it should be noted that Sartre’s account of
scarcity as positing “the mere existence of everyone ... as the constant
danger of non-existence both for another and for everyone” (Sartre
1991a: 130) seems to conflate what is in fact a rather important
distinction. My very existence is really only threatened when certain
particular resources are withheld from me. You threaten me with nonexistence only if you deprive me of such things as food, or water, or
oxygen, or my livelihood. You do not threaten my existence if you
deprive me of coffee, or television. In the descriptive sense, all of
these are examples of scarce resources. They do not exist in sufficient
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quantity for everyone to get all that they want or need all of the time.
But to say that they are scarce does not, on its own, entail that their
lack is a threat to one’s existence. It is a frustration of desire, to be
sure, and it might be even painful, but that is not the same as being
life-threatening. Potable water and iPods are both scarce, but being
deprived of them affects me in radically different ways. The scarcity of
iPods can be a threat if I earn my livelihood manufacturing or
marketing them, but the threat here comes not from the scarcity of
the iPods themselves (which is in fact a necessary condition for me to
make my livelihood off of them at all), but from the scarcity of other
goods I secure through my relation to iPods. Equivocating between the
impact of the scarcity of potable water and iPods trivializes the former
at the expense of the latter. People for whom drinking water is scarce
are threatened with death—when my coffee mug gets low, I am
threatened with inconvenience.
Thus, on the level of those things necessary for our continued
survival, Sartre’s claims about the other threatening me with death
simply by existing may be accurate, but on the level of commodities
and resources that are in themselves superfluous to survival (like
coffee and iPods), the idea that scarcity threatens me with nonexistence is simply false. Again, the phenomenology of scarcity is
telling. To apprehend that something is scarce is not the same as
apprehending that its lack is a threat to my existence. My constitution
of the coffee in my mug as scarce does not bring with it any
awareness of threat. I do not feel the slightest temptation to come to
blows over the next available refill. Even if all the coffee in the world
were to be suddenly destroyed, my suffering would be limited to some
minor caffeine withdrawal headaches. What matters, then, is not the
scarcity of the thing itself, but one’s relation to that scarce thing. If I
were a coffee plantation worker in Columbia or Indonesia, then my
existence could most definitely be threatened by changes in the supply
of coffee. What is more, as Sartre well knew, scarcity can often be a
positive boon for a given individual. If I am the owner of a coffee
plantation in Columbia, then a coffee blight in Indonesia, which would
increase the scarcity of coffee, and thus raise the price at which I
could sell my coffee, would thereby make my own plantation more
profitable. Far from seeing a threat in the scarcity of coffee, I would
see its scarcity as a personally beneficial development.
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Perhaps even more telling, it is not at all clear that the scarcity
even of such organic necessities as oxygen and water necessarily leads
to a Manichean need to eliminate the other who threatens me with
their very existence. Let us return to the oxygen example. As the mine
tunnel collapses and we come to realize that there is no way for us to
escape, oxygen will suddenly become scarce to me in a way that it
never has before. Of course, it was always scarce in the sense that
there was a finite supply, but there was enough for all, and others’
increased use of it cost me nothing. But now it is scarce in the sense
that there is very little of it for my purposes, and if my co-worker Bob
hyperventilates, he is thereby shortening my lifespan. In short, I am
trapped in this mine, and now experiencing oxygen as scarce (in the
normative sense) such that those trapped with me are indeed a threat
to my continued existence by virtue of their own simple presence in
the mine with me. What is important about this example is that in
point of fact, when real miners confront this situation, they do not kill
each other off in order to increase their individual chances for, or
duration of, survival. They know perfectly well that eight miners will
use up the oxygen more quickly than four, which in turn will use it up
more quickly than one. And yet they do not slaughter each other in a
Manichean effort to negate the threat posed by the other. This is
because, as any good existentialist knows, no matter how dire the
circumstances, it is still up to me how I face them, and no matter how
vitally necessary the resource for my survival, I may still decide to
forego it. That is, what all of these examples emphasize once again is
the importance of human praxis in relation to the milieu of scarcity.
Praxis operates at every level in the constitution of scarcity.
Returning to the trapped miners, we have already seen how they may
choose not to actively seek to negate their fellow miners for the threat
they pose by consuming scarce oxygen. Praxis also conditioned the
descriptive scarcity of oxygen in the first place, and the normative
scarcity of oxygen in the collapsed tunnel. The frequency of mining
accidents is not a matter of pure chance. Lax safety standards on the
part of mine owners, managers, and even mining crews, paired with
weak enforcement and monitoring on the part of state and federal
regulatory agencies, contributes to the kind of accidents that lead to
situations such as my example. The scarcity of oxygen for those
trapped miners is thus conditioned, if not directly caused, by the
myriad choices and actions by bureaucrats, capitalists, and miners
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leading up to their predicament. At the same time, the reasons why
the different companies, agencies, and individuals relate to safety
standards the way they do has to do with protecting the profitability of
individual companies and the mining industry as a whole. As we have
already discussed, market rationale (profit) is all about the control and
use of scarcity. So we see here the dialectic between praxis and exis at
work. The background milieu of scarcity makes it “rational” to relax
safety standards to improve efficiency in the mining process, this
praxis in turn conditions the scarcity of safety, scarcity of the resource
being mined, scarcity of job and personal security for the miners, and
so on. All of this can in turn lead to an increase in mining accidents,
causing a situation like the example used above, which in turn
conditions further praxis on the part of the trapped miners. Human
praxis conditions, and is conditioned by, scarcity – “every individual
[is] both a cause and a victim of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 131).
Sartre’s stronger claims that scarcity conditions human
reciprocity in a way that is fundamentally antagonistic seems dubious
in light of the importance of praxis in the dialectics of scarcity. Scarcity
is, to be sure, a fundamental condition of human interaction. When
scarcity is understood in such a broad manner, so as to include such
“resources” as time and ideas, then it would seem that for any given
human action, one could find a reason behind it which points toward
scarcity of some resource. If, as Sartre held, human action is directed
toward the negation of a lack, then it would seem that scarcity is in
some sense a necessary condition for human action itself. That is, if
we understand any lack in terms of a scarcity, and lack is what drives
human choice and freedom, then all action can be understood as an
attempt to address scarcity – it is need. This, in turn, means that if
there were no scarcity, there would literally be nothing for us to do.
Aronson makes this very point: “The fantasy that human acts might be
purer and more rigorous if wholly divorced from need is the opposite
of the truth: without need we do not even have ‘the dream of acting’”
(Aronson 1987: 215). Human praxis is thus saturated with scarcity,
but it does not seem to necessarily follow from this that all praxis must
be Manichean and directed toward violence and conflict.
Indeed, as Aronson suggests, if scarcity drives need, and need
drives praxis, then it is scarcity, in some sense, which makes praxis
possible at all. But Aronson does not go on to discuss the implications
of this claim. On the one hand, we must choose how to act in relation
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to the scarcity we confront in a given situation. Very often this may be
in exactly the sort of Manichean fashion Sartre describes, but this is
not always the case. On the other hand, when one looks at those
manifestations of scarcity that are paradigmatic causes of human
conflict, one cannot escape the praxis that conditions that scarcity
from the start. Food production is notoriously inefficient, as is our use
of land resources in relation to that production. The scarcity of potable
water is equally problematic, insofar as people insist on living in large
numbers in places (like Phoenix or Las Vegas) where water is hard to
come by, and in polluting and wasting what water there is that is
readily available. For any given scarce resource one can locate at the
root of any given human conflict, one can find human praxis
conditioning and even exacerbating that scarcity. Thus, it is at least
arguable that the resources sufficient to satisfy our most basic needs
are not, in the normative sense of the term, scarce, even though they
are certainly finite, and thus scarce in the descriptive sense. To be
sure, it is this finitude that makes possible and intelligible the use of
resources as a means for profit, such as through the privatization of
water supplies, the exportation of “cash crops” to rich countries at the
expense of growing staple crops domestically, and so on. The truth
that Sartre did capture in his discussion of scarcity is the idea that
scarcity is what makes conflict work. One can exploit others, and
threaten their existence, because important resources are not
absolutely abundant and easily obtained, but it is not necessary that
we behave in this way.
Ultimately, there is always scarcity in the descriptive sense,
which conditions the human praxis that generates and/or exacerbates
scarcity in the normative sense. But there is an important difference
between those of us who exploit that scarcity at the expense of others,
and those who work toward human flourishing in spite of scarcity. If
we look seriously at the complexity of causes and effects of scarcity in
relation to genuine necessities, we will find not some mechanical
economic or political “law”, but human agency at work. Sartre saw
scarcity as fundamentally alienating, but again this seems to be more
a matter of how people act rather than what is or is not simply in the
world. Scarcity and adversity can bring people into conflict, but it can
also bring them closer together. Sartre claims that “scarcity is
experienced in practice through Manichean action” (Sartre 1991a:
133), and that we will behave violently toward each other “until the
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elimination of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 736-737), but it is not at all
clear why this must be so.

Freedom Through Scarcity
Struggle and conflict, as we have seen, “precisely represent the
manner in which men live scarcity in the perpetual movement to
transcend it” (Sartre 1991b: 13). The claim has never been that
scarcity compels us to relate to each other in antagonistic ways, but
only that scarcity functions as a fundamental condition that renders
conflict reasonable in a strong sense. At the same time, Sartre does
seem to claim that scarcity in the descriptive sense of limited capacity
points toward a world that is ultimately hostile to humanity. He states
that “conflicts and social struggles as much as individual battles are all
conditioned by scarcity: negation of man by the Earth being
interiorized as a negation of man by man” (Sartre 1991b: 13). The
question that emerges is whether the mere fact that resources are
finite means that the earth is a “negation of man.” If we bear in mind
the distinction between what I have referred to as the descriptive and
normative senses of scarcity, it is not at all obvious that finite
resources necessitate Manichean struggle as an interiorized expression
of the earth’s negation of humanity. Resources can be finite, but
sufficient, provided that human goals and practices are organized in
such a way that finitude does not entail threat. If one accepts the idea
that scarcity is as much a result of human praxis as it is a cause of it,
then a space is opened up in which that praxis can work with scarcity
instead of against it.
Sartre argues that within the milieu of scarcity human praxis
must ultimately take a Manichean turn, leading to violent struggle
against others who pose a threat by their very existence. Against this
view, I have offered two arguments. First, that there is a confusion
here between two senses of scarcity that in turn leads to a
misunderstanding about what is or is not a threat. Your existence
threatens mine only if your consumption of resources literally deprives
me of the means of my continued existence. Within a market economy
this can indeed be quite common, but this says as much about the
functioning of the market economy as it does about descriptively
scarce resources. Second, since it is the case that instances of real
threat need not lead to violent struggle and that such instances of real
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threat are often deeply conditioned by praxis, as in the example of
trapped minors and lax safety standards, claims that violent conflict is
inevitable just seem inconsistent with the existential phenomenological
ontology that informs the Critique of Dialectical Reason. If one
interprets this text as in some sense a response to the excesses of
Being and Nothingness in terms of the “radicality” of human freedom,
it would seem that Sartre is over-stating his case. That is, in
attempting to emphasize the important ways in which exis or facticity
conditions praxis or transcendence at a fundamental level, and thus
counteracting what seem to be the solipsistic ontological tendencies of
his earlier work, Sartre goes too far, and portrays praxis as
determined, as opposed to conditioned, by exis, at least as it relates to
scarcity.5
Sartre is surely right that scarcity is fundamental to the human
condition. Indeed, I have suggested above that insofar as human
praxis is directed toward the negation of some lack, it is scarcity, in
the broadest sense of the term, that is at the root of every instance of
human action – without scarcity, there would be nothing for us to do.
What this means is that rather than seeing the elimination of scarcity
as necessary for the overcoming of human conflict and violence, such
an elimination—which Sartre rightly saw as practically, if not logically,
– 64 – Michael J. Monahan impossible—would in fact make humanity,
as freedom, impossible. Humanity truly is both the cause, and the
consequence, of scarcity, and the symbiotic aspects of that relation
cannot be underestimated. It is true, therefore, that human beings
must struggle against scarcity, but not qua scarcity. We need not
struggle against scarcity as finitude, which would be quixotic at best,
but rather we must struggle against scarcity as threat. Sartre, echoing
liberal social contract theory, proclaims that there is not enough for
everyone, but not enough for everyone to do what? Not enough for
everyone to survive? Or not enough for everyone to have all that they
could desire? He is clearly correct if we assume the latter, but it is not
at all obvious if we take the former interpretation. It is a question, in
other words, not just of how much there is in the world at any given
time, but also a question of how much we need, how much we desire,
and what we are doing to address those needs and desires. Scarcity in
the normative sense, which is the sense that points toward threat, is
contingent upon human ends – there is not enough for some goal or
desire. The struggle against scarcity in that sense, then, is a struggle

Sartre Studies International, Vol 14, No. 2 (Winter 2008): pg. 48-70. DOI. This article is © Berghahn Books and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Berghahn Books does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Berghahn Books.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

to take control not only of the resources we need, but over our desires
themselves. This must take place in a context in which resources are
finite, to be sure, but if our goals and desires are more modest, finite
resources might well still be sufficient.
Another implication of this analysis is that we need to reconsider
the goal toward which we are aiming. Sartre may refer to the
“elimination of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 736-7) or the “transcendence”
of scarcity (Sartre 1991a: 137), but I have suggested that, given the
relation between scarcity, need, and practice, this may not be
desirable even if it were possible. McBride suggests that “the idea of a
potential overcoming of scarcity might prove useful as a sort of
limiting- concept, an asymptotically approachable goal against which
genuinely possible historical change for the better could be measured”
(McBride 1991: 110), but this still takes the ideal of a scarcity-free
world as valuable (or at least “useful”). I submit that the
“transcendence” of scarcity should never be understood as an endstate to be achieved or even asymptotically approached, but rather initself as a constant and ongoing process in which we must be
continually engaged – freedom is only manifest in a struggle with and
through scarcity, it is not some end goal to be achieved (or
approached) by the elimination of scarcity. Likewise, in his discussion
of reciprocity in Sartre’s Critique, Catalano makes the following
observation: “This spiral unfolding of praxis never achieves synthesis
in a Hegelian sense, because praxis takes place within a milieu of
scarcity” (Catalano 1986: 144). I have argued elsewhere (Monahan
2006: 411-413) that this is a deep misunderstanding of Hegelian
dialectic precisely insofar as it treats the supersession (Aufhebung) of
the terms of the dialectic as an end state, rather than an ongoing
process. The dialectic of scarcity as both a condition of and as
conditioned by human praxis will never reach some particular point or
moment at which it is “transcended” or resolved, and any view of
liberation which holds this as an ideal must be abandoned.
Fortunately, Sartre provides conceptual resources that are, I
submit, invaluable in correcting the weaknesses in his account of
scarcity and its relation to praxis. Foremost among these is his account
of group praxis itself. Recall that the originary moment of group praxis
for Sartre, the “fusing group”, arises out of a negation of some threat
(negation of a negation). To be sure, threats may take many forms,
but one of them, certainly, is scarcity. Indeed, early in his discussion
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of fused groups, Sartre uses famine as an example of a negation
leading to a fusing group (Sartre 1991a: 350). As he states:
… the group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or common
danger and defines itself by the common objective which
determines its common praxis. Yet neither common need, nor
common praxis, nor common objectives can define a community
unless it makes itself into a community by feeling individual
need as common need, and by projecting itself, in the internal
unification of a common integration, towards objectives which it
produces as common (Sartre 1991a: 350).
This passage makes clear the way in which a threat or negation need
not drive individuals into a Manichean free-for-all, but may (though
surely contingently) provide an avenue for the emergence of group
praxis. The “common objective” of confronting and negating the threat
posed by scarcity6 can thus serve in effect as an organizing medium
for group praxis, which, in turn, is a manifestation of (mediated)
reciprocity (Sartre 1991a: 392, 419).
Of course, Sartre reminds us repeatedly that the milieu of
scarcity, as a manifestation of alterity, is always exerting itself as an
inertial force driving us back toward series-being. But, as I have
stressed above, the very idea that scarcity must be overcome in some
definite, terminal sense needs to be abandoned. Groups, and their
response to the threats that engender them, must always be
understood as in process, and never as a complete, finished product.
As Sartre states: “…we can in fact define the group as a perpetual
reshaping of itself, in accordance with objectives, with exterior
exchanges and with internal imbalances” (Sartre 1991a: 407). What is
crucial is that the possibility of forming a common project around the
negation of scarcity is always a possibility, and the presumption of its
impossibility can only ever serve to undermine that possibility. The
question is whether we will begin seeing scarcity in the descriptive
sense as an opportunity to organize group praxis directed toward the
control and satisfaction of human goals within that context of scarcity,
or continue to understand it as a threat which drives us into
solipsistic/atomistic relations of reciprocal hostility and competition. To
see the outcome of this dilemma as pre-determined is simply
inconsistent with existential phenomenology. The problem, therefore,
is not one of scarcity as such, but rather is about those who take
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advantage of scarcity to exploit and oppress other human beings. At
the same time, we must not aim toward some end state beyond
scarcity, but rather we must strive consistently and self-critically to
realize human freedom and positive reciprocity within and even
through a milieu of scarcity.
So what, ultimately, can we make of the Jamaican dairy farmers
who destroy their product? Insofar as market forces made their action
economically rational, and market forces function as they do because
of scarcity, we can say that it is scarcity that conditions their actions.
But this is not simply a matter of the finitude of the milk supply in
Jamaica, or even globally. It is ultimately a matter of the ends toward
which the human praxis involved in the production, distribution, and
sales of dairy products is directed within a context of finite resources.
And the ends here, first and foremost, are profit. That is not an
inevitability. If the goals of dairy production were the provision of food
to those who need it, it is not at all clear that dairy would need to be
scarce in the normative sense. By recognizing the inevitability of
scarcity in the descriptive sense, and then conflating it with scarcity in
the normative sense, it can be made to appear that the struggle for
scarce resources is an inevitability of the human condition. For any
given individual working solipsistically to satisfy her every desire, this
account would seem accurate. But Sartre rejects this ontology, and
offers a way to see the challenges posed by scarcity not as a threat to
individual existence, but as an opportunity for relations of reciprocity
directed toward the shared project of doing the best we can, rather
than the best I can, with the resources available to us. That resources
are scarce is not up to us, but how we confront that scarcity is.
I do not think this is an easy or simple problem to deal with.
Part of the beauty of Sartre’s discussion of scarcity is the way in which
he draws out its complexity. Much work remains to be done here. How
should we frame the project of the management of scarcity? What
might the criteria or desiderata for success look like, given the
rejection of the ultimate “overcoming” of scarcity as an end-state in
lieu of an ongoing process of self-critical confrontation with scarcity as
a goal? What are the best means for achieving this goal, once it is
taken up? Again, my purpose here is not to settle these issues, but to
open a discussion of them. If the possibility for human praxis exists
that avoids Manichean conflict in spite of scarcity, then there is a real
need for elaborating the ways and means of that praxis. I have argued
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for that possibility. It is now our collective task to point toward ways to
make it reality.
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Notes
1. Marx’s treatment of scarcity is somewhat different, rather complicated, and
in any event beyond the scope of this paper.
2. Indeed, even scarcity itself can become scarce within a market economy, a
phenomenon typically referred to as “overproduction” (Sartre 1991a:
138-139). Within the milieu of scarcity, according to Sartre, each
individual becomes a “man [sic] of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 131), who,
in “seeking his abundance, seeks it as a determination of scarcity. Not
abundance for all, but his own, hence the deprivation of all” (Sartre
1991b: 421). Value itself is a function of scarcity, and thus in order to
secure the value of one’s possessions, or at least preserve it, one must
ensure that others do not acquire it. In other words, one must protect
the scarcity of precious resources, for if that scarcity should itself
become scarce, then the value of one’s resources is threatened.
3. I am well aware that this is a clichéd example, especially in a paper on
Sartre. Nevertheless, it is true, and it yields particularly rich material
for phenomenological investigation. And so I will refrain from conjuring
some less tried and true example for the sake of originality, and stick
with the tired, worn, and yet eminently serviceable café example.
4. The influence of this coffee culture on its scarcity cannot be
underestimated. As a graduate student, I had several colleagues who
deliberately cultivated a taste for coffee precisely because meetings
with students, professors, and peers inevitably took place in coffee
shops. They felt that it would be odd for them to meet in coffee shops
and not drink coffee, so they basically taught themselves to like it.
Thus, their consumption of coffee, and in turn their contribution to its
scarcity, is a result of a deliberate choice predicated upon the choices
and actions of others. It is because so many others consume coffee so
frequently that they became coffee consumers themselves.
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5. I offer this more in the spirit of a suggestion, rather than as a full
argument, which would be beyond the scope of this essay.
6. Here again the distinction between the normative and descriptive senses of
scarcity is critical. One may, at least temporarily, negate scarcity in
the normative sense, but not in the descriptive sense. That is, we can
see to it that supply is increased so that it is adequate to our need, or
we may find another way to satisfy that need, or we may work
together to reduce the need itself, but we cannot create a limitless
supply.
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